The Resurgence of Mexican Railways: A Militarized Infrastructure State amid the Second Cold War

By Carlos ESCALERA, October 2025 | PDF
Dispatch 2025.5

Introduction

The construction of Mexico’s railway network began in the final decades of the nineteenth century and reached its zenith on the eve of the Mexican Revolution, acquiring a layout that has remained largely unchanged ever since, with only minor expansions built throughout the twentieth century. Today, railways are returning to Mexico as part of an infrastructure-led development strategy pursued by recent governments, after decades of aspatial neoliberalism that fostered their abandonment and privatization. The Maya Train and the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (CIIT), among other projects, exemplify this revival in transportation infrastructure.

Claudia Sheinbaum, the current president, has doubled down on the course set by Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), aiming to consolidate the political project he launched and translate it into stronger economic results by announcing more than 3,000 kilometers of new railways to connect the country. However, their construction has primarily been entrusted to the Mexican armed forces—the Army and Navy—who plan, execute, and manage them, thereby expanding their functions beyond public security. The military is viewed as more efficient and faster in delivering infrastructure, yet its expanding role raises concerns about transparency and democratic accountability.

This militarized infrastructure state, with railways at its forefront, is central to the country’s objectives of industrialization and regional development. This is especially salient as the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States makes Mexico an attractive destination for the relocation of production from Asia to North America. The challenge for Mexico’s political elite is to fully capitalize on the opportunities offered by nearshoring while navigating the interests of both superpowers and consolidating its hold on power at home.—
The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the SCWO.

Mexico’s Nearshoring Opportunity in the Second Cold War

The Second Cold War is characterized by a global dynamic to structure and control the strategic nodes of infrastructure, production, digital, and financial networks. This context, which mostly features China and the U.S. as its main actors, is not an attempt to reverse globalization but to reshape it. Therefore, third countries seek to stay aligned with and connected to both superpowers, as the logic of this competition does not incentivize them to remain isolated from global value chains, thereby favoring a “polyalignment” strategy.

In this context, Mexico may benefit from the relocation of companies from Asia to North America—a process known as nearshoring—in what is widely considered the most competitive macro-region globally. In recent decades, Mexico has served as an export platform for the U.S. and Canada, thanks to its free trade agreement with both countries (USMCA). Now, the U.S.–China trade war, together with the COVID-19 pandemic, have precipitated changes in the functioning of multiple global value chains that favor Mexico’s position in several sectors, including the automotive industry. The country has advantages such as its proximity to end markets, industrial capacity, and an abundant workforce with competitive labor costs. If Mexico upgrades its industrial and logistics capacity amid nearshoring, it could cement its role as a “connector country” between the Asia-Pacific and the North Atlantic regions. Yet to fully realize that role, it must also enhance its internal connectivity—particularly to ports and border crossings—to integrate peripheral regions, prevent industrial concentration, and promote balanced regional growth through stronger transport infrastructure.

Militarization of the Infrastructure State during Mexico’s Fourth Transformation

The 2018 national elections marked the beginning of a radical transformation of the Mexican political system. That year, a new political party, Morena, won a majority in Congress and brought AMLO to the presidency. This majority allowed him to advance his hegemonic project, the Fourth Transformation (or 4T), which included an array of neo-developmentalist policies that combined social assistance programs (which ultimately lifted 6 million people out of poverty) with a set of strategic infrastructure projects to bolster domestic industry, including upgrades to and construction of oil refineries, as well as new and rehabilitated railways. Such projects have been funded primarily with public resources to gain autonomy from both international and domestic private financial actors, even as foreign firms—including Chinese companies—have been contracted for construction.

The development of infrastructure also included a new airport on the outskirts of Mexico City, next to a military air base. The construction of Felipe Ángeles International Airport (AIFA) was entrusted to the Mexican Army, which, although accused of irregular contracting, completed the project in record time. The armed forces are often said to operate with greater efficiency and control than other public institutions or the private sector, albeit at the expense of transparency and accountability. Eventually, the armed forces created over a dozen state-owned companies during AMLO’s term to manage trains, airports, ports, parks, hotels, and an airline. There is even a holding company that groups them. Thus, this new militarism in Mexico involves using the armed forces to advance a political project, aligning the institution more closely with the presidency and ruling party.

The empowerment of the military to compete in the market and undertake large-scale infrastructure projects necessitated “state restructuring.” Power was rebalanced within national institutions or situated in new ones, regulatory reforms were introduced to fast-track infrastructure projects, and augment state capacity. Now, this restructuring is continuing in response to the opportunity structure shaped by the U.S.–China geopolitical rivalry. In some instances, it has resulted in the emergence of the infrastructure state, which can mobilize substantial capital for spatial projects to enhance transnational connectivity. In Mexico, state restructuring has been deployed most notably to modernize the railway system. Through a presidential decree by AMLO, followed by a constitutional reform under Sheinbaum, rail transport was designated a national development priority, and the Mexican state regained the authority to provide passenger rail service. The reform also created a new federal rail agency entrusted not only with regulation but also with the planning, construction, and operation of rail projects.

The process of state restructuring is also exemplified by the establishment of military-controlled state enterprises and by executive decrees shifting responsibilities from civilian agencies to the armed forces. The Maya Train embodies both dynamics. Designed to expand tourism from the Mexican Caribbean coast into the interior, the railway loops around the Yucatán Peninsula, cutting through dense jungle, prompting protests from local communities and environmental groups. After civil-society organizations obtained several injunctions to halt construction, AMLO alleged that some were receiving funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the government subsequently designated the Maya Train—and other infrastructure projects—as a matter of national security and transferred their management to the Army.

Industrial Spatial Planning and Strategic Railways

Meanwhile, the new elite continued to expand. In the 2024 elections, Claudia Sheinbaum—AMLO’s ally and successor—won with 60% of the vote. Morena also won an absolute majority in Congress, enough to pass constitutional reforms, such as the one that thoroughly transformed the judiciary, expanding the elite’s footprint into that institution. Once in office, Sheinbaum presented her development strategy, Plan México, which envisions the construction of dozens of specialized industrial parks—the Development Hubs for Well-being (PODEBIS)—across the country by 2030, through tax incentives aimed at making domestic and foreign investment more profitable.

The PODEBIS were first conceived as part of the CIIT. The 300-kilometer Tehuantepec Isthmus is the narrowest land bridge in North America between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The corridor—which includes a railway that connects the ports of Salina Cruz and Coatzacoalcos, originally laid over a century ago—is intended not only to be a logistical alternative to the congested Panama Canal, but also a hub for industrial processing of goods moving across it, with more than ten PODEBIS scattered along this strategic land bridge. The Korean automaker Hyundai was among the first to use the CIIT to transport a full shipment of automobiles from Asia to the East Coast of the United States.

While the railway was still under rehabilitation, AMLO ordered the Navy to occupy a stretch of track, thereby completing the CIIT up to the Port of Coatzacoalcos, after declaring it a matter of “public utility.” This section was operated by Grupo México, the Mexican mining giant, which holds more than half of the country’s freight-rail concessions. Its main competitor, Canadian Pacific Kansas City—the only single-line railway serving all three North American countries—controls roughly a third of the freight-rail network. In the end, Grupo México ceded the segment to the CIIT but obtained trackage rights along the corridor and an extension of its existing concessions. Although the conflict was “amicably” resolved, the episode demonstrated that the government would take any necessary measures to reclaim rail infrastructure for the state.

Once in office, Sheinbaum announced the construction of two long-distance passenger railways that would connect Mexico City to Nogales and Laredo at the border with the U.S. The railways will pass through major cities such as Guadalajara and Monterrey, projected industrial corridors under Plan México. Some sections of these railways have been entrusted to the Army for construction. For example, a branch of a suburban train connecting Mexico City to the AIFA airport was assigned to the Army after many delays in its completion; it had previously been entrusted to a private company. A stretch of the passenger railway that connects Mexico City to Querétaro is also under Army control. The Sheinbaum administration also began work to adapt the Maya Train for freight service. She signed an agreement with the presidents of Guatemala and Belize to extend the CIIT and the Maya Train to Central America. Both railways—already linked by a segment of track—are located in southern Mexico, which has the highest national concentration of poverty and underdevelopment.

Conclusion

Morena’s elite has maintained continuity in its development strategy, pairing active industrial policy with popular support through social assistance programs. To capitalize on nearshoring, the Mexican government has undertaken a railway revival—relying primarily on public spending and the armed forces—with the aim of enhancing internal connectivity for freight and passengers, advancing industrialization, and rebalancing uneven regional development, while positioning the country as a connectivity hub between Asia and North America. Thus, the Second Cold War is accelerating a militarized modernization of infrastructure in Mexico, prioritizing speed and efficiency over transparency and democratic oversight. This yields a domestic paradox: consolidating political control risks weakening the very investment attractiveness on which nearshoring depends.

This process has unfolded with Donald Trump as Mexico’s neighbor to the north imposing tariffs to pressure Mexico to adopt trade and security policies aligned with U.S. interests. He has also threatened to withdraw from USMCA and to intervene militarily against drug cartels, conjuring up Porfirio Díaz’s famous declaration: “Poor Mexico, so far from God, and so close to the United States.” A second paradox follows from the country’s polyalignment strategy: leveraging its deep integration with the U.S. while keeping ties to Chinese value chains to make nearshoring operationally effective. If Mexico does not want its plans for industrial upgrading and enhanced autonomy to derail, it must learn to navigate the Second Cold War with one of its main contenders at its border.


Carlos M. Escalera is PhD student in Political Science at El Colegio de México (COLMEX). His research examines economic corridors in Mexico and Brazil through the lens of the geopolitics of state capitalism; I recently returned from a five-month research stay in Brazil.