The Resurgence of Mexican Railways: A Militarized Infrastructure State amid the Second Cold War

By Joscha ABELS, October 2025 | PDF
Dispatch 2025.5

Introduction

The construction of Mexico’s railway network began in the final decades of the nineteenth century and reached its zenith on the eve of the Mexican Revolution, acquiring a layout that has remained largely unchanged ever since, with only minor expansions built throughout the twentieth century. Today, railways are returning to Mexico as part of an infrastructure-led development strategy pursued by recent governments, after decades of aspatial neoliberalism that fostered their abandonment and privatization. The Maya Train and the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec (CIIT), among other projects, exemplify this revival in transportation infrastructure.

Claudia Sheinbaum, the current president, has doubled down on the course set by Andrés Manuel López Obrador (known as AMLO), aiming to consolidate the political project he launched and translate it into stronger economic results by announcing more than 3,000 kilometers of new railways to connect the country. However, their construction has primarily been entrusted to the Mexican armed forces—the Army and Navy—who plan, execute, and manage them, thereby expanding their functions beyond public security. The military is viewed as more efficient and faster in delivering infrastructure, yet its expanding role raises concerns about transparency and democratic accountability.

This militarized infrastructure state, with railways at its forefront, is central to the country’s objectives of industrialization and regional development. This is especially salient as the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States makes Mexico an attractive destination for the relocation of production from Asia to North America. The challenge for Mexico’s political elite is to fully capitalize on the opportunities offered by nearshoring while navigating the interests of both superpowers and consolidating its hold on power at home.—
The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the SCWO.

Dr. Joscha Abels is a political economist and postdoc at the Institute of Political Science, University of Tübingen. He focuses on infrastructure and geoeconomic competition, the global role of the EU, and the transformation of state-business relations. His current research focuses on communication, from submarine cables to satellite constellations.

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