China’s engagement in party-to-party diplomacy in Africa dates back to the late 1950s, during the early African liberation movements. Initially, these interactions were driven by  China’s mission to export communist revolutionary ideals while seeking recognition from the global community (Benabdallah, 2020; Eisenman, 2023). A key motivation of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in Africa was to solidify its status as the legitimate government of China as opposed to the Republic of China (ROC) government based in Taiwan. Furthermore, Beijing sought to counter  Soviet influence in the Global South during the Cold War (McHenry, 2021; Song, 2015).

To achieve these goals, China established the International Department of the CPC (ID-CPC), which cultivated relationships with foreign communist parties and national liberation movements, particularly from Africa. A cornerstone of this approach was its alliance with the Former Liberation Movement in Southern Africa (FLMSA) (Eisenman, 2023), which includes political parties that led the independence struggle in seven southern African states. These parties include the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia, Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, or Revolutionary Party), South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC), the Zambian United National Independence Party (UNIP), and the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). 

One of the most notable projects under the partnership of CCM and UNIP was China’s construction of the TAZARA Railway in the early 1970s. The project was more than a transportation link; it symbolized China’s commitment to African liberation movements. In return, the Tanzanian and Zambian governments assumed the leading role in the ratification of the UN Resolution 2758 that granted Beijing a seat at the United Nations (Cabestan & Chaponnière, 2016; Song, 2015).

Evolution of Party-to-Party Relations

Over time, Sino-African party-to-party diplomacy, known as "weiwen," (stability maintenance), has gradually shifted from exclusively ideological partnerships to include economic engagements and other forms of peer-to-peer support to ensure the ruling regime’s survival. Since 2017, responding to Xi Jinping’s call for closer political cooperation, the ID-CPC has invited tens of thousands of African political party officials to China to enhance interaction, dialogue, and understanding of China’s governance and development model. Attendees (e.g., members of African political parties) attend training courses and meetings organized by ID-CPC in Beijing (Mishra, 2022). Visits are often accompanied by guided tours to key historical sites and major infrastructures, particularly those demonstrating China’s economic muscle and technological advancements (O’Brien, 2016). A central theme in these exchanges is China’s rapid economic development, particularly in terms of alleviation of poverty, job creation, technological innovation, anti-corruption, and the fight against neo-colonialism (Otele, 2023; Sanny & Selormey, 2020).

Material Support and Political Influence

In addition to training and ideological exchanges, party-to-party collaboration also involves material support. Examples include the CPC-supported refurbishment of the Herbert Chitepo School of Ideology in Zimbabwe and the establishment of a leadership school for the United Democratic Alliance in Nairobi[1]. In 2016, a US$40 million political training center for FLMSA was announced, which is hosted by Tanzania and was jointly inaugurated in 2022 by six out of the seven original FLMSA member parties. The absence of a Zambian liberation party UNIP in this collaboration highlighted China’s preference for ruling parties over those whose power has declined (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2023). Unlike the six allied parties, which have remained in power for decades since gaining independence, UNIP lost power in 1991. This led to accusations that the CPC’s party-to-party operations strengthened the one-party state model (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2023). The ruling party in Tanzania – the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) – changed its constitution at the 2017 party congress and adopted reforms inspired by the CPC. This reduced the size of its apex decision organs, thereby centralizing power within the party. CPC secretary Guo Jinlong praised the reforms as cost-saving. Thus, critics have charged that party-to-party collaboration may cement the power of incumbent governments, while Afrobarometer surveys suggest that about 80 percent of African Citizens reject the dominant single-party system similar to that of China[2].

Balancing Party Relations and Broader Engagement

Chinese government officials maintain that the Chinese development model is not imposed, nor is it a one-size-fits-all blueprint for success. Instead, they stress it is meant to provide an alternative to states in the Global South for which Western development approaches have not worked (Voss & Fabian, 2022). Indeed, the ID-CPC has increasingly expanded its focus beyond relations with ruling parties, and currently, it has established relations with 110 parties across Africa (Roland, 2020). Its network includes opposition parties, and it also works closely with media organizations, think tanks, and NGOs (Mishra, 2022). For example, in June 2021, the ID-CPC expressed interest in collaborating with Gambia’s National People’s Party, which at the time held only four seats in the National Assembly (NBR).

Despite China’s efforts to maintain a veil of neutrality, its deep engagement in African domestic politics remains clear. Historical cases suggest that opposition parties often criticize China’s close ties with ruling parties but seek Chinese investment and diplomatic support once they assume power. A notable example is Zambia’s opposition leader Michael Sata, who in 2014 lashed out at China for ‘unacceptable’ behavior of favoring the ruling party. In response, Chinese actors threatened to pull out their investments from the country in the event that Sata won the election. However, Sata did win the election, and China was among his early international supporters, while he ultimately became a strong supporter of Chinese investment in Zambia (Hess & Aidoo, 2014). This dynamic suggests that opposition parties may use anti-China rhetoric as a campaign strategy, but realpolitik often leads them to engage with China once in office (Matambo, 2019).

Looking Forward

The CPC’s party-to-party diplomacy is a key complement to China’s broader diplomatic and economic engagement in Africa. However, this strategy may be less effective in the future because, according to Afrobarometer surveys, Africans increasingly have a positive impression of China (Otele, 2023). As China’s role in Africa continues to grow, its party-to-party diplomacy will likely remain a strategic tool for consolidating influence.

So what can we conclude about the CPC’s party-to-party operations in Africa today? First, it complements the Chinese Government’s diplomatic efforts. And just as China’s relationship with African countries evolves, so does the CPC’s approach to party-to-party activity. It has expanded over time to include opposition parties and it now includes economic and commercial linkages. A broad conclusion is that party-to-party diplomacy remains a strategic priority for the CPC, and beneficial to ruling elites in African states. Whether this deep involvement stabilizes political systems or reinforces authoritarian tendencies will depend on how African governments and opposition parties navigate their relationships with China and the CPC. What remains clear is that the CPC’s engagement in Africa is not just about diplomacy—it is a long-term investment in political and economic alliances that shape the continent’s future.

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[1] https://www.riotimesonline.com/chinas-political-schools-expanding-influence-in-africa/
[2] https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-escalates-its-political-party-training-in-africa/

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The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the SCWO.