Ge Zhaoguang’s (2018) reflection on the historical processes that shaped modern China seeks to assess whether Huntington’s (1996) “clash of civilizations” is truly inevitable. The significance of this inquiry, particularly in the context of the Second Cold War, lies in Ge’s exploration of the concepts of nation-state, empire, and the tributary system based on the principle of “All-under-Heaven”, and how these ideas have evolved over time. This analysis is crucial for gaining a deeper understanding of the cultural and political conditions that shape China’s approach to international relations and underpin its strategies for economic and cultural expansion.

Ge posits that China maintains an intrinsic sense of a civilizational mission it is determined to pursue—one that does not necessarily entail direct (military) confrontation. However, Ge also warns about the potential rise of nationalist currents within China, which are already tangible in the public discourse, that could influence political leadership and intensify tensions with Western-driven globalization processes.

This dispatch focuses on one single aspect of Ge’s broader text: the formation of culture. Ge considers the historical processes that shape a civilization’s culture to be of paramount importance, particularly in the case of China, which views its cultural expansion as a path to reclaiming a leading role on the global stage—or at least within East Asia. This perspective resonates with Winter’s (2021) reading of the Belt and Road Initiative as a geocultural project.

Ge highlights how, over the past two centuries, China has been significantly influenced by the West, which has altered fundamental aspects of Chinese society and culture, including language and the traditional relationship between family, society, and the state, between others. The gradual penetration of European culture into Asia has transformed and sidelined the conceptual foundations of state relations as traditionally understood in China, particularly the principle of “All-under-Heaven”.

In a nutshell, this principle places the civilising force of Chinese culture at the centre of the world, ensuring peace through a balanced relationship with surrounding countries, which can occupy a peripheral centre within the empire’s cultural boundaries—beyond nation-state borders. The ruler of the central authority is tasked with resolving concrete issues, including military challenges, to protect peripheries and maintain harmony. According to Japanese historian Hamashita Takeshi, this last point is a crucial condition for establishing a modern tributary system. It highlights the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of reviving the traditional concept of All-under-Heaven, as China no longer possesses the capacity to ensure peace in Asia through its own power (des Garets Geddes and Foot, 2024).

Ge does not delve into how China is effectively expanding by building infrastructures across the globe. Scholars have widely addressed this dynamic (e.g., Schindler and DiCarlo, 2022), including the cultural dimension that goes hand in hand with infrastructure programmes (Enns, Bersaglio, and Luhula, 2022). China’s cultural and economic expansion seems to be occurring under the form of a new technological empire. This vision, in fact, aligns with ancient Chinese traditions. Historically, the creation of peripheral centres was partly achieved by sharing technological knowledge related to water management and agricultural techniques (Ball, 2016; Chi, 1936).

The culture-technology nexus is one aspect that invites a deeper understanding of the dynamics underpinning China’s economic expansion. In African regions, for example, digitalization and the development of basic infrastructure have emphasised the inability of various Western nations to improve the living conditions in urban areas of the former colonies. This modern iteration of Chinese expansion thus echoes earlier practices, where technological advancements were used as a tool of influence and integration, shaping regional relationships in ways reminiscent of China’s historical role in East Asia.

Another relevant aspect pertaining the formation of China’s culture and the current socioeconomic structure it permeates, is the result of historical processes that Ge defines as “additions” and “subtractions”. It is worth revisiting the passage:

First, culture forms across history, and history is always adding and subtracting from culture. By “addition,” I refer to the borrowing of traditional resources to undertake creative interpretations of elements of foreign culture that are continuously encountered. This addition took place, for example, in the way educated people in China in the middle ages “matched meanings” (ge yi) of Indian Buddhism with local ideas, transforming foreign ideas into a part of Chinese thought. By “subtraction,” I refer to the selective forgetting of aspects of native culture. Examples of this subtraction include the ways that, in ancient China, some customs that did not adhere to the moral order were remade, or, in modern China, the way that science was used to conduct campaigns against so-called superstition. For these reasons, we cannot say that a fixed, unchanging tradition exists. (Ch. 4, p. 120).

While the example of Buddhism is clearly fitting, Ge remains silent on the more recent “additions”, specifically those stemming from the Maoist revolution and the profound transformation under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, with the introduction of capitalist formations inspired by both Japanese and Western models. He also omits how these changes may have altered Chinese culture. It is true that these processes unfold gradually, and definitive answers may not be available today.

However, some critical questions emerge: What kind of operations are, for China, the adoption of Western political doctrines such as Marxism and Communism, economic systems such as capitalism, and the formalization of Western-style international relations? Have these been additions that are leading—or have led—to the evolution of the fundamental principles of Taoist-Confucian society toward a new cultural synthesis? Or have they caused a subtraction, by abandoning key institutional channels vital to the continuity of Chinese society?

If the latter hypothesis holds true, such a subtraction might render China’s socioeconomic system—despite its extraordinary success in the short run—far too unstable for global security in the medium to long term. This raises deeper concerns about whether these “additions” and “subtractions” are contributing to a long-term recalibration of Chinese cultural and political identity or whether they are undermining foundational structures that have sustained China’s social order throughout its history.

Capitalism seems to have taken deeper root in Chinese society, while communism shows signs of being a flawed addition. In fact, communism in China was effectively abandoned when the production and distribution of money were delegated to a commercial banking system—what Schumpeter (1976) identifies as the fundamental characteristic of capitalism. Thus, communism does not seem to be part of the cultural heritage shaped through historical processes of both internal and external encounters and conflicts. This suggests that the Second Cold War is being forged in the crucible of (networked) capitalism.

Capitalism provides a shared platform for cultural and economic exchange between China and the West, but now that platform is showing cracks. First, on the front of corporate competitiveness, where the West is already responding with (radical) changes in industrial policies. Second, on the front of global financial integration. The increasing official reluctance in Europe to invest in companies with Chinese ownership stakes raises significant concerns about potential repercussions on the economic relations with China. Chinese direct and indirect investments in Europe are decreasing, for instance, while European companies continue investing in China—where a consistent part of Europe’s industrial production is located. This necessitates tackling potential risks regarding European industrial resilience and Eurasian connectivity.  

The intensification of cultural disparities within the context of interactions between both public and private corporations and financial institutions—posited within the context of increasing tension between China and the West—emerges as a critical area of inquiry. A thorough understanding of these dynamics is crucial for gaining a more nuanced insight into potential future developments in the Second Cold War.

REFERENCES

Ball, P. 2016. The water kingdom: A secret history of China. Vintage.

Chi, C.-T. 1936. Key economic areas in Chinese history. Allen & Unwin.

des Garets Geddes, T. and Foot, R. 2024. China and the World: Reflections by Zhang Yunling. Signification. (October 1). https://www.sinification.com/p/china-and-the-world-reflections-by

Enns, C., Bersaglio, B., and Luhula, M. 2022. Mediating the Infrastructure State: The role of local bureaucrats in East Africa’s infrastructure scramble, in S. Schindler and J. DiCarlo (eds.), The rise of the Infrastructure State: How US–China rivalry shapes politics and place worldwide. Bristol University Press.

Ge, Z. 2018. What is China? Territory, ethnicity, culture & history. Harvard University Press. Translated from the original [2014] by M. Gibbs Hill.

Huntington, S. P. 1996. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. Simon & Schuster.

Schindler, S. and DiCarlo, J. (eds.) 2022. The rise of the Infrastructure State: How US–China rivalry shapes politics and place worldwide. Bristol University Press.

Schumpeter, J. A. 1976. Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Routledge.

Winter, T. 2021. Geocultural Power: China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Geopolitics, 26(5), 1376–1399. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1718656

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The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the views of the SCWO.